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1970]

able contract probably would fail in Florida,31 it might be used
successfully in other jurisdictions.
James R. Watson

Domestic Relations - Recognition of Foreign
Modifiable Alimony Decrees
Suzanne S. Hill obtained a divorce from Ernest B. Hill on July
7, 1955, in Washington County, Pennsylvania. Thereafter, the custody of the children was awarded to Suzanne, and Ernest was ordered to pay support money for the maintenance of the children.
Pennsylvania law provides that support decrees may be modified,
either prospectively or retrospectively, as the case may warrant.'
Modifications of the order pursuant to the Pennsylvania statute
were made at various times, the last being October 30, 1964, requiring Ernest to pay $250.00 per month maintenance and $50.00 per
month toward past due installments. Ernest then moved to West
Virginia and subsequently failed to make the payments under
the Pennsylvania decree. Upon Ernest's failure to make the required
payments, Suzanne instituted an action in Pennsylvania which was
transmitted to the Marion County Circuit Court according to the
provisions of the Uniform Support Law of Pennsylvania. The
Marion County Circuit Court dismissed the action on the grounds
that the Pennsylvania order, by virtue of the statute, did not possess
the requisite finality to be entitled to full faith and credit under the
Constitution of the United States. Suzanne appealed to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Held, reversed. The order, while
modifiable, was sufficiently final as to be entitled to full faith and
credit. Hill v. Hill, 168, S.E.2d 803 (W. Va. 1969).
' See note 4 supra for an excerpt from FLA. STAT. § 708.07 (1969) which
requires joinder of the husband before "encumbering real property". FLA. STAT.
§ § 693.03, 708.07 (1969) require such contracts to be executed in the presence
of two witnesses. See Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957); Frederick
and Logan, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AGAINST MARRIED WOMEN, 16 U. FLA. L. REv.

353 (1963).

'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 26a (1962)."Any order . . . made . . . for the
support of a wife, child or parent, may be altered, repealed, suspended, increased, or amended, and the said court may, at any time, remit, correct or reduce
the .moInt 9f 'rrearages, as th( ase may witrr .t"
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The problem of interstate recognition of foreign decrees is one
that is inherent in our federal system of government. The scope
of this comment is to consider one aspect of that problem-the enforcement of modifiable foreign maintenance and support decrees.
The practice in most states, whether by statute or by power
of the court, is to permit maintenance and support decrees to be
modified. 2 Normally this power extends to the payment of accrued
as well as future installments.3 As a result of this practice, enforce4
ment of decrees for alimony outside the granting state is difficult.
The difficulty arises because alimony decrees, for the purpose of
enforcement, are considered to be the same as money judgements.
Since the common law action of debt required that money judgments be final and for a sum certain in order to be entitled to full
faith and credit, the same requirement was imposed upon alimony
decrees. The imposition of the requirement of finality upon a alimony decrees compounded the already existing problem of full
faith and credit and thereby negated the advantages of modifiable
decrees.
The early decisions of the United States Supreme Court
illustrate the tendency to classify decrees for alimony with money
judgments.6 In Sistare v. Sistarel the petitioner sought enforcement
of a prospectively modifiable foreign alimony decree as to accrued
installments. The Court held that a decree for future alimony, even
though modifiable prospectively, is entitled to full faith and credit
as to accrued installments so long as the installments are not
retroactively modifiable. A prior decision of the Supreme Court
had permitted a foreign judgment for arrears, which had accrued
under a prospectively modifiable foreign alimony decree, to be
granted full faith and credit.8 The Court, however, stated that the
Constitution did not require a state to establish a modifiable foreign decree as a decree of its own courts, with all the remendial
advantages of a local decree.
2

Note, Enforcement of Foreign Non-Final Alimony Decrees, 18 VAND. L. REv.
830, 831 (1965).
3Id.
at 831.
'Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony and Support Orders
53 COLUM. L. REv. 817 (1953).
'Id. at 818; Note, supra note 2, at 834.
OSee Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Barber v. Barber, 62 US. (21
How.) 582 (1858).
'218 U.S. 1 (1910).
'Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
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A concurring opinion in Barber v. Barber9 indicates what may
be considered a trend toward a different conclusion with respect
to enforcement of modifiable decrees for alimony. In that opinion
Mr. Justice Jackson emphasized the fact that finality was not
a requirement of the full faith and credit clause. Neither the full
faith and credit clause10 nor the Act of Congress implementing
itl even mentioned final decrees.
The assertion of Justice Jackson in the Barber case was echoed
two years later by Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter in Griffin v.
Griffin.12 Justice Rutledge, dissenting in part, approached the
matter from a standpoint similar to that of Justice Jackson. He
noted the absence of a constitutional requirement of absolute
finality, and proposed that all judgments sufficient to sustain the
13
issuance and levy of execution be entitled to full faith and credit.
Justice Frankfurter, also dissenting, took issue with Justice Rutledge's proposal but favored- the granting of full faith and credit to
modifiable foreign ailmony decrees. Justice Frankfurter's
ideas are best expressed in his concurring opinion in New
York ex reL. Halvey v. Halvey.r' In Halvey Justice Frankfurter sugguested that the inherent differences between alimony decrees and
ordinary money judgments should be evidenced in the law. It
follows, then, that the flexibility which provisions for modification
lend to the law, should not be defeated by technical questions of
finality.1
- 323 U.S. 77, 87 (1944) (concurring opinion).
0 U.S. Cowsr. art. IV, § 1, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."
"28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964). "The records and judicial proceedings of any
court of any State . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
... [the] State... from which they are taken."
327 U.S. 220 (1946).
1
Id. at 247 (dissenting in part).
"Id. at 249 (dissenting opinion).
00330 U.S. 610 (1947).
"Id. at 616 (concurring opinion).
Conflicts arising out of family relations raise problems and involve
considerations very different from controversies to which debtor-creditor
relations give rise. Such cardinal differences in life are properly reflected
in law. And so, the use of the same legal words and phrases in enforcing full faith and credit for judgments involving the two types of
relations ought not to obliterate the great difference between the interests affected by them, and should not lead to an irrelevant identity
in result.
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The opinions of Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Frankfurter
have led a few furisdictions to extend full faith and credit to
foreign alimony decrees, modifiable both prospectively and retrospectively. One such jurisdiction, California, holds that while the
Constitution does not require the enforcement of modifiable
decrees, neither does it prohibit a state from recognizing a decree
as a matter of comity. 7 The practice in California is to establish
the foreign decree as a decree of the California courts with the
same effect and methods of enforcement as a local decree. Minnesota
courts take the view that so long as a judgment is absolute in its
terms and remains unmodified, or until an application for modifica8
tion has been made, it is entitled to full faith and credit.'
Prior to Hill v. Hill the leading case dealing with modifiable
foreign decrees in West Virginia was Henry v. Henry.' The Henry
case reflected the commitment of the West Virginia courts to the
traditional view of modifiable foreign alimony decrees. The lack
of finality in the foreign decree was the ground upon which the
court refused to extend full faith and credit. The Henry case, however, is distinguishable from the usual one involving a degree for
alimony, in that the decree was for alimony pendente lite. Furthermore not only was the granting of alimony temporary, but the
suit for separation in which it was granted was not prosecuted to a
final decree. It is thus a classic example of the type of factual situation in which the traditional requirement of finality could, with
some justification, be applied. There are, however, some persuasive
arguments which call for the application of the same rules of en20
forcement to both temperary and permanent decrees for alimony.
The Hill case presents a situation completely different from
Henry, since the action in the former was based on a final but modifiable decree. The substantive issues concerning the circumstances
existing at the time of the decree had been conclusively determined
...The scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is bounded by
its underlying policy and not procedural considerations unrelated to it.
Thus, in judgments relating to domestic relations technical questions
of "finality" as to alimony and custody seem to me irrelevant....
"Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922).
IL74 W. Va. 563, 82 S.E. 522 (914).
' See Jacobs, The Enforcement of Foreign Decrees For Alimony, 6 LAw &

CoxsaP. PROB. 250, (1939).
"If the husband is able to escape his obligations by going to [another
state] something is the natter with the law bi this fieol,"
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in Pennsylvania. The statute granting Pennsylvania courts the
power to modify alimony decrees did not vest the courts with absolute discretion in such matters, since a court through its own
caprice could not alter a decree. On the contrary, a showing of a
substantial change in circumstances attendant to the decree was
required in order to affect a change. 21
The effect of Hill v. Hill is to permit an action to be brought
for accrued installments based on a retroactively modifiable foreign
alimony decree. The defendant, of course, must be given an opportunity to present any defenses in modification of the decree that
would be available in the granting state.2 2 A judgment so rendered
is then final and is entitled to full faith and credit just as a similar
determination in the original state would be. Thus the approach
taken by the West Virginia Supreme Court is generally akin to
that of the Minnesota courts. It must be remembered, however, that
enforcement of a prospectively modifiable decree as to future installments was not at issue in the Hill case. When a proper case
arises, the court will be faced with the option of either moving
toward the principles adopted by the California courts or limiting
the enforcement of modifiable decrees to those situations covered
by the present decision.
The decision in the Hill case eliminates the possibility of a
party escaping a duty of support, under a retroactively modifiable
decree, by leaving the granting state.23 A contrary decision would
force the plaintiff to seek enforcement of the decree in Pennsylvania,
either by attaching the property, if any, of the defendant or by
reducing the arrears of the decree to a final judgment for a sum of
money.2 4 Consequently, the Hill case allieviates the necessity of
reducing the accrued installments to a judgement in the decreegranting state before bringing suit in West Virginia. One comprehensive action now accomplishes the result which previously required two actions in two different states. 25 The expense and delay
in obtaining a judgment is thereby reduced considerably, which

'See Commonwealth ex rel. Blumhardt v. Blumhardt, 129 Pa. Super. 443,
195 A. 790 (1937).
1Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal,2d 465, 471, 283 P.2d 19, 23 (1955).
2 See Note, supra note 2, at 380; scoles, supra note 4, at 817.
25

See Note, supra note 2, at 830.

See Scoles, supra note 4 at 817.
'd, at 817.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 3 [1970], Art. 11
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 72
is of paramount importance to low-income groups. 20 The decision
in Hill v. Hill is, therefore, consistent with a growing trend toward
the extension of full faith and credit to modifiable decrees, 27 and to
analogous situations in the law28 in accordance with sound public
29
policy.
Francis Lucas Warder, Jr.

Income Tax - Tax Status of Employer
Financed Scholarships
Messrs. Johnson, Pomerantz, and Wolfe, employees of Westinghouse, were granted leave of absence for the purpose of researching and writing their doctoral theses. Mr. Johnson, as typical of the
three plaintiffs, was granted leave from October 1, 1960 through
June 30, 1961, and during this period he pursued the educational
undertaking on a full time basis. Westinghouse paid him $5,670.00
which represented 80% of his normal salary for the period. Income taxes were withhold and Westinghouse treated the expenditures as indirect labor expenses on their records. The subject of the thesis had to relate at least generally to the employer's
business. Employee benefits were continued and the employees
were obligated to return to Westinghouse for a specified period at
the end of the study leave. Claims for a refund were filed on the
basis that the amounts received were schelarships or fellowship
grants and excludible from income under section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 The Supreme Court, in reversing
Barber v. Barber, 323 US. 77 (1944), See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44

Cal.2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Grossman v. Grossman, 242 SCG. 298, 130 SE.2d

850 (1963).

'Scoles, supra note 4, at 820; New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947) (child custody); People ex rel. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 39 II.2d 76, 233
N.E.2d 382 (1968) (child custody).
2"See Scoles, supra note 4, at 817.
'Section 117.

(a) General Rule. In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include(1) any amount received(A) as a scholorship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151 (e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed sr-
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